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Manley R. Irwinf and Robert E. McKeef
The common ownership of public utility and private manufactur-
ing activities has long posed conflicting implications for public policy.
Nowhere is this conflict more evident than in the vertical relationship
exhibited by the communication equipment industry. The integration
of utility and supplier may yield production economies, reduce com-
munication equipment costs, and ultimately lower the price of commu-
nication service. On the other hand, vertical integration, in addition to
aggravating regulatory problems, may lend itself to market abuse by
restricting market entry, squeezing nonintegrated rivals, and passing
cost inefficiencies forward into the common carrier's rate base. The line
separating market efficiency and market power is by no means clearly
defined. But the fact that nearly ninety percent of the communication
equipment market is supplied by manufacturing affiliates of common
carriers suggests that these issues cannot be dismissed lightly.'
There are three basic alternatives for structuring the communica-
tion equipment industry: (1) to maintain the present vertical integra-
tion of utility and supplier; (2) to permit vertical integration, but to
require the utility to solicit competitive bids; and (3) to separate the
utility from the supplier and thereby foster open market rivalry. Al-
though the present integration seems efficient at first glance, it tends in
practice to encourage decisions that are economically unsound from the
standpoint of society. In addition to analyzing the deficiencies of the
present integrated system, this article attempts to determine the most
appropriate mode of competition for the industry and to demonstrate
that the Federal Communications Commission has the power to restore
competition in major segments of the communication hardware market.
t Associate Professor, Whittemore School of Business & Economics, University of New
Hampshire. Ph.D. 1963, Michigan State University. The authors wish to acknowledge the
critical comments of Professors J. Dirlam of the University of Rhode Island and M. A.
Duggan of the University of New Hampshire. They of course bear no responsibility for
the views expressed herein.
i Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.S. 1961, University of Maryland; J.D.
1964, University of Chicago.
I See Answer at 4, United States v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civil No. 64-1912
(S.D.N.Y., filed June 19, 1964).
VER TICAL INTEGRATION
I
THE EXISTING MARKET STRUCTURE
The integration of utility and supplier that dominates the commu-
nication industry is illustrated by the organization of the Bell Tele-
phone System and the General Telephone System. The Bell System is
the larger in both common carrier and manufacturing activities. Its
twenty-two associated companies account for the bulk of the nation's
local and toll telephone service. Bell's manufacturing subsidiary, West-
em Electric, supplies approximately ninety percent of the equipment
needs of the Bell System companies and almost eighty percent of the
total output in the domestic market.2 The addition of Bell Laborato-
ries, the research arm of the system, and American Telephone and
Telegraph, the parent firm, completes what is generally known as the
Bell System.
The General Telephone System mirrors the Bell System. On the
utility side, General operates the nation's second largest telephone sys-
tem; on the hardware side, General's manufacturing affiliates (Auto-
matic Electric, Lenkurt, and Leich) supply apparatus to its affiliated
telephone companies. The General System differs from AT&T, how-
ever, in that General Telephone Company owns the telephone utilities
but is not itself an operating company.
The remaining two thousand telephone or telegraph carriers, inde-
pendent of both Bell and General; are relatively small, as are the dozen
or so independent equipment manufacturers. Since the integrated car-
riers prefer-though they are not required by contract-to purchase
their hardware requirements from or through their captive affiliates, for
all practical purposes the equipment market can be treated as vertically
integrated.
II
MARKET CONFIGURATION-EVALUATION OF POLICY ALTERNATIVES
In evaluating the three basic policy alternatives--vertical integra-
tion, vertical integration with competitive bidding, and no integration
(i.e., competition)--one should bear in mind that the relevant equip-
ment market embraces the total equipment market, not merely part of
it. If, for example, vertical integration is judged suitable for General or
Bell, then independent carriers should likewise be permitted to pur-
chase or merge with suppliers. Conversely, if arm's-length competition
2 Florida Pub. Util. Comm'n, General Investigation of Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
Order No. 3715, Nov. 30, 1964, at 4 (testimony of General Services Admin.).
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between supplier and utility is deemed appropriate, that policy must
embrace the entire equipment market.
A. Vertical Integration
Maintaining the status quo is an obvious possibility. A common car-
rier under no constraint to conduct competitive bids may funnel equip-
ment orders to its captive supplier. The policy of in-house procurement
is defended on two grounds, one theoretical and the other empirical.
The theoretical rationale of vertical integration equates joint own-
ership with economic efficiency. The argument is that equipment costs
and communication service rates are minimal because economies of
integration permit the meshing of research, service, and manufacturing
activities. Ultimately, the consumer benefits from these economies. The
most spirited empirical defense of vertical integration originates with
the Bell System. In some two hundred rate cases, Western Electric prices
were shown invariably to be lower than those of independent suppliers.3
This evidence, often imposing, lends credence to the economies-of-
integration thesis; the relationship with Bell permits Western Electric
to avoid advertising expenses, sales costs, and credit risks. In short, ver-
tical integration, rather than a competitive market, best meets the test
of cost efficiency.
But these arguments are not necessarily conclusive. Under public
utility regulation, carriers are entitled to earn a reasonable return on
their investment. A large segment of Bell's rate base consists of plant
and equipment purchased from its affiliate. Absent the checks and bal-
ances of market rivalry, hardware affiliates, adopting a cost-plus philos-
ophy, can merely pass unwarranted manufacturing costs forward to the
utility's rate base. The opportunity is certainly attractive, in view of
the peculiar structure and incentive of integrated entities. Of course,
since the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone
Co.,4 regulatory commissions can, in fixing rules for Bell operating com-
panies, inquire into the reasonableness of the prices and profits of West-
ern Electric. Nevertheless, without direct regulation of equipment affil-
iates, it is difficult for regulatory bodies to detect such practices, much
less bring them to an end.
Further, there is no test for determining the appropriate profit range
for a utility-owned manufacturing unit. And, since no other supplier
occupies a similar position, this void cannot be filled by examining the
8 R. Bickett & T.W. Spicer, "Indirect Regulation of Western Electric" (informal talk
given to Amherst Group, Dec. 20, 1962).
4 282 U.S. 133, 152-53 (1930).
[Vol. 53:446
VERTICAL INTEGRATION
existing market. The supply affiliate, obviously insulated from the usual
hazards of the market, neither invites nor seeks public utility status.
Accordingly, the vacuum is filled not by an appropriate theory of risk
or comparable earnings, but rather by something resembling the cor-
porate conscience. The difficulty is that this conscience has more than
a passing interest in profits, particularly when its parent firm's earnings
are circumscribed by regulation.
It is true that the two hundred rate cases show that Western Elec-
tric's prices are below those of comparable items supplied by noninte-
grated firms. These economies ostensibly compel the Bell operating
companies to turn to their supply affiliate for hardware needs. Presum-
ably, General Telephone justifies its in-house procurement policy on
similar grounds. Low hardware prices, however, may not be optimum
prices, and there are profound obstacles to detecting, much less measur-
ing, the difference. Comparing the prices of independent manufactures
with those of Western Electric, as Bell has done in the rate cases, does
not provide the answer, since market structure bears directly on market
performance. By foreclosing market access, the integrated utility can
saddle independent firms with restricted output, high per-unit costs,
and resulting high prices. Price comparison studies between integrated
and nonintegrated firms thus tend to become meaningless; vertical inte-
gration rigs the very standard invoked to justify the economies of the
utility-supplier. In short, empirical price comparison studies, long ac-
cepted by the courts as a test of reasonableness, tend to beg the cost
question.5 The equipment supply industry can seek to sell at optimum
prices only if it is allowed to develop in a truly competitive atmosphere.
Obviously, not all vertical integration can be viewed as antagonistic
to market efficiency. Indeed, the merger of buyer and seller often can
effect pronounced cost savings, but the existence of these savings is usu-
ally tested by a competitive market. Transplanting such integration to
a regulated industry, however, creates unique problems. Given the me-
chanics of rate base determination, the suspicion is never settled that
the captive supplier is receptive to its parent's rate making philosophy.
5 For a typical defense of Western Electric price studies, see Phillips, Some Obser-
vations on the FCC's Telephone Investigation, 77 PUB. UTiL. FORTNIGHTLY, Feb. 17, 1966,
at 23, 32-33.
With respect to the reasonableness of Western Electric's prices and profits,
what additional proof can a vertically integrated company offer to justify "in-
ternal" prices that are not subject to a direct market test (i.e., that are not subject
to arm's length bargaining) beyond the price comparisons and reasonableness of
profit standards laid down by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel Co.?
Id. at 33.
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B. Vertical Integration with Competitive Bidding
In contrast to pure vertical integration, a second alternative links
competitive bidding to the utility-manufacturer relationship. Although
the telephone utility retains its interest in the manufacturer, it must
nevertheless solicit competitive bids from nonaffiliated equipment sup-
pliers. In this sense, competition riding tandem with vertical integra-
tion seeks the best of both worlds. But its approval of the utility-
supplier complex, such a policy seems to approve the economies-of-
integration thesis. Yet, by adding the external pressure of competition
in the equipment market, this alternative regularly tests the alleged
economies identified with the integrated utility.
This approach raises several problems. First, given the present
market structure and the costs of present manufacturers, the indepen-
dent firms apparently cannot compete effectively with the integrated
suppliers. Who, then, is to keep the independent firms alive until per-
haps they can grow or develop so as to be able to compete? A first can-
didate is the integrated rival itself. But should utility-owned suppliers
underwrite their competitors? If they do not, the independent suppliers
may turn to government subsidy, a move that would be justified by
their role as guardians of utility-supplier efficiency. The result, how-
ever, would be the spectacle of public subsidies under the guise of mea-
suring monopoly efficiency. The question whether competing firms can
survive thus compounds rather than simplifies public policy in the
equipment market.
A second problem is that, even if the independent supplier can
offer lower prices than the affiliated one, the telephone utility is un-
likely to purchase outside merely on the basis of the lowest bid. Price
is only one of many variables that include quality, delivery time, tech-
nical competence, and ability to get along. The carrier, needless to say,
is hardly in a position to judge "other things being equal"; and the list
of standards is sufficiently broad to accord the telephone utility virtual
discretion in its procurement policy.
A third obstacle to grafting competitive bidding on vertical inte-
gration turns on the carrier's allocation of research and development
expenditures. Bell Laboratories, the research arm of the Bell System,
divides its expenditures between AT&T and Western Electric.6 AT&CT
in turn assigns this cost to the twenty-two associated Bell companies
under terms of its licensed contract. Thus, when Western Electric sells
equipment to a Bell operating company, Western's costs include only
part of the total research and development expenses of Bell Laborato-
6 FCC, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE TErPHONE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITEn
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 340, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 196-97 table 40 (1939).
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ries. Both flows of research and development expenses, of course, merge
and determine part of the carrier's revenue requirements; the consumer
of telephone service does not care about the mechanics of research and
development allocation, since his telephone rate reflects the final inci-
dence of research expenditures in any case.
The independent equipment supplier, however, views this cost
allocation with less equanimity. Even if it enjoys lower production costs
on a competitive product, there is no guarantee that it can demonstrate
a lower price. The nonintegrated company's price must cover both man-
ufacturing and research costs, whereas the integrated supplier's price
covers less than total research costs. As one manufacturer put it:
Since carriers obtain their revenues from rates levied on public
usage of their facilities, and since portions of this revenue are uti-
lized to develop new techniques, the question is also raised con-
ceming the propriety of permitting carriers with manufacturing
capability to utilize funds derived from public sources in such a
way as to force other companies into a noncompetitive position. 7
Thus, low cost and efficient performance by independent suppliers
may not necessarily be rewarded by market entry. Competitive bidding
may be undermined by the complexities of internal cost allocation, a
division of revenues that artificially consigns to the carrier's manufac-
turing affiliate the role of perpetual low bidder.
A fourth and final problem is that the integration-with-competition
solution embraces conflicting cost assumptions. If vertical integration is
justified by inherent economies, then the nonintegrated firm is redun-
dant and cannot long survive. If, on the other hand, no economies can
be identified with vertical integration, then, though it may be justified
from the point of view of the firm, this corporate relationship clearly
has no validity in terms of the economy as a whole. In either case, patch-
ing vertical integration with a competitive bid mandate emphasizes
policy form rather than policy substance.
C. Competition
Open market rivalry stands as a third policy choice for the equip-
ment industry. This alternative is grounded in the assumption that the
relationship between utility and supplier manifests no inherent econo-
mies of integration. Since manufacturing the apparatus is an activity
separate and apart from rendering communication service, separation
of the utility and the supplier marks a first step in bringing to the
equipment market open access, rivalry,, and true efficiency.
7 Report and Order, Proposed Global Communications Satellite Sys., 38 F.C.C. 1104




VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE INNOVATIVE PROCESS
The economies-of-integration thesis holds that the common owner-
ship of private manufacturers and public utilities confers optimum
costs upon communication services. If one assumes that the state of the
technical art is fixed, it is conceivable that a manufacturer with a cap-
tive market can reach for output levels without fear of product obso-
lescence or rising variable costs. Clearly, however, the assumption that
technology is fixed defies reality. With the exception of the aerospace
industry, communications and electronics firms receive the highest pro-
portion of government research contracts.8 It must also be noted that
economies arising from the innovative process dictate downward shifts
in average cost curves, whereas economies of size are identified with
downward movements along a static cost curve.
Economies of integration, then, must be measured in dynamic,
rather than static, terms; and here vertical integration tends to dampen
innovation because of its anesthetizing effects on research and develop-
ment efforts. Operating in a noncompetitive market, an integrated sup-
plier is not under pressure to introduce new products arising out of its
own research efforts. But more important, since the market is essentially
foreclosed, the independent supplier is reluctant to engage in research
and development efforts without any hope of recovering those research
dollars. All of this not only imposes social cost in terms of products
denied or delayed, but artificially constricts the number of firms seek-
ing multiple, diverse, and alternative approaches to the innovation
process.
Because the depressive effect of vertical integration on the innova-
tive process resists precise quantification, we must resort to a case study
approach. The cases include communication satellites, microwave com-
munication systems, and computer forwarding and data attachments.
A. Communication Satellites
Satellite relay systems became feasible in the late 1950's through
simultaneous developments in rocketry and microwave technology. In
1959 the Bell System proposed a global satellite network consisting of
satellites placed in random orbits at an altitude of about 6,000 miles.9
Because any given satellite would be within radio range for only some
twenty minutes, continuous transmission of communications required
8 Research and Development in the Electrical Equipment and Communication Indus-
try, 1956-62, 2 REvImWs or DATA ON SCIENCE RESOURCES, Jan. 1965.
9 Testimony & Exhibits of J.B. Fisk at 16, In re Allocation of Frequencies in the
Bands Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959).
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construction of pairs of ground stations and the orbiting of approxi-
mately fifty satellites. This translated into formidable capital outlays
that precluded most firms from participating commercially in satellite
systems. Indeed, the formation of the Communication Satellite Corpo-
ration as an industry consortium was premised on the heavy investment
required for the satellite relay systems.
By contrast, the synchronous satellite plan places the satellite at an
orbit altitude of approximately 22,300 miles. The period of satellite
revolution, approximately the rotation of the earth, makes the satellite
appear fixed. Since this enables each satellite to cover one-third of the
earth's area, fewer satellites are needed. Also, this plan permits much
less complex ground stations which need merely adjust to relatively
fixed satellite positions. Technical simplicity translates into such cost
reductions that one corporation, the American Broadcasting Company,
has applied for its own private domestic satellite system for broadcast
purposes.10
The synchronous satellite plan, now a standard approach to com-
mercial satellite systems, was not sponsored by the integrated carriers.
Rather, it was advanced by Hughes Aircraft and Lockheed, noninte-
grated aerospace equipment suppliers." Time has demonstrated that
these nonintegrated suppliers were on the right track in both tech-
nology and cost.
B. Microwave Transmission of Television
Microwave communication systems provide another case of tech-
nological innovation. Voice, data, or facsimile can be transmitted
through coaxial cable systems or point-to-point radio communication
networks. Before World War II, the Bell System invested heavily in
coaxial cable systems, anticipating television and voice traffic. Micro-
wave technology stands in contrast to coaxial or wire cable systems.
Radio signals are transmitted between repeater towers located twenty
to thirty miles apart, obviating the need for pole rights of way and thus
lowering circuit costs.
By the end of World War II, this equipment, now available com-
10 ABC's application prompted the FCC to open a separate inquiry. In re Establish-
ment of Domestic NonCommon Carrier Communication Satellite Facilities by Non-
Governmental Entities, 2 F.C.C.2d 668, 671 (1966).
11 Hearings on Satellite Communications Before the House Comm. on Gov't Opera-
tions, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 373 (1964) (testimony of Dr. Puckett):
The Hughes Aircraft Co. has been active in the study and development of com-
munication satellite system hardware since early in 1959. Our studies at that time
led us to believe that there would be very important advantages in the use of
a synchronous satellite for communications.
See also LocKH.YD AmcRArr CoRp., Missu.Es & SPACE Div., TELESTAT (1961).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:446
mercially, enabled Western Union to begin construction of a radio relay
network.' 2 However, the FCC's refusal to order interconnection of the
telegraph company's facilities with the Bell System effectively elimi-
nated the Western Union microwave system as a means of delivering
television transmission service.' 3 Later, the Bell System shifted its in-
vestment from coaxial cable to microwave radio.14
Although Western Electric manufactures the bulk of today's heavy-
duty microwave equipment, the lesson of the Western Union experi-
ence cannot be lost. The innovation of microwave technology was spon-
sored by nonintegrated suppliers who preceded their integrated coun-
terpart.
C. Private Microwave Transmission
Radio relay techniques can be privately owned as well. Before
1960, however, noncarrier use was prohibited because of limitations in
the frequency spectrum; entities with large communication require-
ments necessarily leased lines from the common carrier industry. In
the middle 1950's the FCC received petitions to liberalize radio fre-
quency licenses from two sources. Large business users sought private
microwave as a means of reducing lease charges paid to the communi-
cation carriers, and manufacturers sought to exploit private microwave
as an outlet for equipment and related hardware.
12 H. Golden, The Domestic Telegraph Industry and the Public Interest 246 (unpub-
lished dissertation, Harvard University, 1950).
13 Docket No. 9539, In re Establishment of Physical Connections & Through Routes
& Charges Applicable Thereto, 6 An. L. (Ist ser.) (1951). See also Beelar, Cables in the
Sky and the Struggle for Their Control, F. Coar. B.J., Jan. 8, 1967, at 31-32:
Television broadcasters appeared unexpectedly as a late challenger to AT&T's
position as the sole source of TV network service. In the late 1940's, many tele-
vision broadcasters could not get video network channels from AT&T for net-
work televison programs, a serious handicap to a rapidly expanding TV industry.
Accordingly, several television broadcasters undertook to construct microwave
facilities to other cities where physical connection could be made with common
carrier facilities. AT&T, however, had by tariff precluded the interconnection
of private microwave systems with its own facilities. In its December 23, 1949,
decision in the tariff investigation in Docket No. 8963, the FCC required AT&T,
over its objection, to interconnect with TV broadcasters' private microwave
facilities. Otherwise, it was pointed out, the Commission's grant of license to TV
broadcasters for the operation of interim microwave video program transmission
facilities would be rendered a nullity.
While the broadcasters had won the battle, it was AT&T which had none-
theless won the war. For previously, on February 20, 1948, the FCC had rather
casually made a policy determination that frequencies for video network facilities
would be only for service furnished by common carrier facilities, and that broad-
casters operating interim private microwave stations would be required to aban-
don such systems whenever service became available from a common carrier, i.e.
AT&T. Hence, while the broadcasters were accorded interim interconnection
rights, the long term result was to give AT&T the green light to displace private
microwave systems of broadcasters whenever it was ready, willing and able to do so.
14 LONG LiNEs DErT, AT&T, OuR CoMPANY AND How IT WoRKs (1960).
VERTCAL INTEGRATION
In 1959, and again in 1960, the FCC liberalized its frequency li-
censing policy so as to permit private operation and ownership.15 This
decision challenged both the policy and structure of the integrated com-
mon carriers. If a customer rented circuits, Bell's or General Tele-
phone's suppliers accounted for the bulk of the related hardware. On
the other hand, when users elected to build and operate their own mi-
crowave systems, they purchased equipment from independent manu-
facturers. Thus, the nonintegrated manufacturers competed with the
Bell System without benefit of economies of integration. In so doing,
the independent suppliers were literally circumventing the vertical
structure of the common carriers.
Within months after the FCC's decision to liberalize microwave
use, the Bell System reduced its communication rates by fifty to eighty-
five percent in a tariff called Telpak.16 According to Bell, its rate reduc-
tion, which was restricted to volume users only (i.e., those capable of
building their own microwave systems), was justified by competitive
necessity.'7 But Telpak reopened the issue of efficiency and vertical in-
tegration. Had Bell cut rates because of inherent cost economies asso-
ciated with its vertical structure, or had it cut rates without commen-
surate reduction in costs?
Part of the answer was provided by the Commission's 1963 Tele-
graph investigation. The FCC staff requested that Bell identify its fully
allocated cost and return on seven of its interstate services. The study
revealed striking differences between Bell's return on its competitive
and noncompetitive services. In particular, Telpak generated a return
of about 0.3 percent, a level generally deemed inadequate by both car-
15 Report and Order, In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc,
27 F.C.C. 559, 870-71 (1959). See also Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Allocation
of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960) (reaffirming 1959 position
on petitions for reconsideration).
16 "Private Microwave systems make available large communication capacity at costs
substantially below the charges for common carrier services furnished under other tariffs."
Bell System Exhibit No. 5, Record at 3, Memorandum Opinion and Order, AT&T
(TELPAK), 87 F.C.C. 1111 (1964). See SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, A STuDy OF SMALL
BusINEss IN THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY 3 (1962). Seventy percent of noncarrier manufac-
tured microwave systems was supplied by Motorola, Collins Radio, RCA, and General
Electric. Motorola provided the largest share. For the size and profit status of a typical
independent microwave supplier, see Record at 15-16, Report and Order, In re Allocation
of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 ,Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959) (testimony of Daniel E.
Noble, Electronic Industries Ass'n):
1. Personnel-400--500 people
2. Engineering Budget-800,000
3. Gross Income-7-8 million dollars
17 Brief & Proposed Findings and Conclusions for Bell System Respondents at 20-21,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, AT&T (rELPAK), 87 F.C.C. 1111 (1964).
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riers and public utility bodies.' 8 Moreover, the evidence presented in
the FCC's investigation suggested that Western Electric had not been
the prime mover in the cost reassessment. According to testimony by the
General Services Administration, the Bell System cut its leasing rates,
and then pressured its manufacturing affiliates to lower equipment
costs.19 Telpak prices, to be sure, had swung the cost advantage away
from private microwave and back to the leased circuits. But Bell's seven-
way cost study suggested that the Telpak discount was impelled not by
economies internal to the integrated utility-supplier, but rather by con-
ditions of market rivalry.
D. Computer Message Forwarding-Switching and Data Attachments
Computer systems can be programmed to switch message commu-
nications as well as to process data-a capability that directly challenges
the conventional method of routing printed communications, i.e., the
torn-tape switching system. Although the torn-tape operation can be
automated, computers are replacing the torn-tape switching manufac-
turing equipment provided by the common carriers. The computers
achieve a fifty percent reduction in cost and close to a 200 percent in-
crease in message output.20 Indeed, computer competition has prompted
the FCC to open a separate investigation. 21
Again technology questions the impact of vertical integration on
the diffusion of new technology. As noted, the carriers traditionally
lease torn-tape relay equipment and private line circuits. These relay
systems are now being replaced by equipment provided by noninte-
grated manufacturers, in this case, suppliers of computer hardware. And
again nonintegrated firms have taken the lead in the introduction of
new switching technology.
A related case turns on the development of data attachments
18 Report of the Common Carrier Bureau of the FCC in the Telegraph Investigation,
FCC Docket No. 14650, table 6-3. See also AT&T Exhibit 80, Record at 19, FCC Docket No.
14650:
If the market for Telpak had developed in a manner consistent with the fore-
cast of the total bulk communication market, made at the time the service was
introduced, the earnings ratio on a current cost basis during the study period
would have been approximately 9.5%. On the basis of the actual market, devel-
oped during the period covered by this study, this ratio was about 5.5,%.
19 See Exhibit No. 2, Record at 24, FCC Docket No. 14650 (testimony of Richard
Gabel, General Services Admin.).
20 " . . . AT&T is . . . unhappy that a lot of its automatic and manual mechanical
switching equipment is being replaced by computers built by other manufacturers."
Chrysler's Computer Does the Talking Faster and Cheaper, BUSINFSS WEEK, Aug. 24, 1963,
at 52, 53. See also Letter from Western Union to FCC regarding computer leasing and
service arrangements, March 14, 1966.
21 Notice of Inqury, In re Interdependence of Computer & Communication Services, 7
F.C.C.2d 11 (1966). -
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known as subsets or data modems. These devices enable business ma-
chines to send digital information in varying quantities over telephone
lines. On the public telephone networks the carriers permit only sub-
sets manufactured, supplied, or controlled by themselves. Equipment
that does not fall into this category is termed "foreign," and carrier
tariffs forbid their use or attachment to the dial-up network.
By contrast, the carriers have relaxed "foreign attachment" prohi-
bitions on circuits supplied exclusively to business and government
entities. The result is that the user is now presented with options for
data sets in terms of their number, variety, and technical capability.
These choices are not matched by carrier-provided data modems. Even
this minimal market access has given an incentive to firms to invest in
research and development and thereby introduce competitive, alterna-
tive solutions to the problems of data transmission. We submit that the
rate of innovation of such equipment on leased lines stands as a tribute
to the innovative energies of the nonintegrated firm.
E. Conclusions
These case studies suggest that a wave of new technology is now
pressing major constituents of what we know as the communication
industry.22 Yet, the technical decisions of the integrated carriers, as well
as their receptivity to new processes, is open to serious question. In each
of the above cases, the nonintegrated supplier challenged the technical
status quo and pushed for the adaptation of new products and processes.
It is our view that if the equipment market were opened to effective
competition, the innovative process would be greatly encouraged, and
ultimately consumers would reap the benefits of cheaper and better
services.
IV
IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC POLICY DECISIONS
A. 1949 Antitrust Complaint
In 1949 the Department of Justice instituted a suit against AT&T
and Western Electric, alleging violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act.23 The Department charged that the defendants had con-
spired to restrain competition and had monopolized the manufacture
and distribution of telephone equipment. It was alleged that Bell Sys-
tem operating companies, under the direction of AT&T, were com-
pelled to purchase their equipment from Western Electric. The avowed
purpose of the suit was to reinstate competition in the telephone equip-
22 Present terminal systems are also being challenged by cathode ray tube display
units, acoustic couplers, concentrators, and the like.
23 United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49 (D.N.J., filed Feb. 14, 1949).
1968]
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ment industry in order to bring lower prices to the Bell operating
companies and, in turn, lower rates to the consuming public.
The relief sought was twofold. First, AT&T was to divest itself of
Western Electric, which was to be divided into three competing enti-
ties. Second, the Bell operating companies were to procure their equip-
ment by competitive bids. AT&T denied the allegations generally and
contended that Western Electric provided equipment to the operating
companies at lower costs than its competitors could provide. Bell also
submitted that telephone rates to the consumer would rise if Western
Electric were divorced from AT&T.
The consent decree ultimately entered granted neither of the rem-
edies sought.24 Western Electric was neither divorced from the system
nor dismembered; 25 the Bell operating companies were not required to
procure their equipment through competitive bidding. Thus, Western
Electric remained, for all practical purposes, the sole manufacturer and
supplier for Bell telephone companies.
B. The Private Microwave Decision
The economies of microwave operations and the growth of bulk
or volume communication requirements prompted major firms to con-
sider acquiring private radio relay systems. By the mid-1950's, the FCC
found itself besieged by applications from potential users of private
microwave. Manufacturers, retailers, railroads, and trucking carriers
sought FCC frequency assignments without restriction, contending that
the supply of frequencies in the microwave region was virtually unlim-
ited and that rationing was no longer required to conserve the radio
spectrum. 26
The common carrier industry strenuously opposed any change in
the allocation policy. AT&T, the most articulate spokesman for the car-
24 Consent Decree, United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49 (D.N.J., Jan.
24, 1956).
25 See Answer at 14-15, United States v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civil No.
64-1912 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 19, 1964):
Defendants are informed and believe that an important factor leading the Depart-
ment of Justice to consummate the Bell System consent decree was the existence
of comprehensive regulation by both Federal and State government of telephone
operating companies. Defendants are informed and believe that another factor
leading to the approval by the Department of Justice of the Bell System consent
decree was the determination that the vertical integration of the Bell System
(consisting of the Bell System telephone operating companies, a telephone equip-
ment manufacturing company, Western Electric Co., and a research laboratory,
Bell Laboratories) was in the public interest because, among other reasons, it
improved the quality and lowered the cost of telephone service, and increased
the ability of the Bell System to assist in the national defense effort.
26 Report and Order, In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc,
27 F.C.C. 359 (1959).
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riers, contended that the frequency supply was limited and required
careful allocation.27 The carriers also argued that an FCC policy to
promote private microwave would render economic harm to the com-
munication industry and thus inhibit its ability to provide the nation's
communication services.
When the Commission ruled in 1959 to open the spectrum to gen-
eral use, the Bell System contended that satellite communications and
the spectrum requirements thereof altered the premise upon which
the FCC had promulgated its policy.28 The Commission reopened the
question and again adopted a liberalized licensing policy with respect
to land microwave. 29 The decision, of course, represented a defeat for
the common carrier industry.
C. Communication Satellite Act of 1962
The Communication Satellite Act of 196230 was born in contro-
versy. Its legislative history depicts government agencies and private
firms as both adversaries and allies. A major problem was the owner-
ship, size, and composition of the company that would make the first
commercial use of satellite techniques. The international common
carriers, notably International Telephone and Telegraph, Radio Cor-
poration of America, and AT&T, expressed willingness to establish a
consortium limited to themselves.3 1 After an inquiry, the FCC con-
cluded that satellite ownership should be limited to the international
carriers, a decision opposed by some firms in the aerospace industry.3 2
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, by contrast,
had argued that the ownership base should be broadened to include
all interested equipment suppliers.33 Relaxing its prior position in
deference to the FCC, the Justice Department, apparently overruling
the Antitrust Division, concluded that, if the independent suppliers
were given competitive access to the consortium, ownership could be
27 Record at 2218-19, Report and Order, In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands
Above 890 Mc, 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959) (testimony of F.M. Ryan, AT&T).
28 Id. at 16 (testimony of James B. Fisk).
29 Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands
Above 890 Mc, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960).
s0 47 US.C. §§ 701-44 (1964).
81 Notice of Inquiry. Authorization of Commercially Operable Space Communications
Systems, FCC Docket No. 14024, 26 Fed. Reg. 2880 (1961).
32 Id. See Comments of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation on Petition of General Electric,
FCC Docket No. 14024. See also General Electric's Petition for Reconsideration, FCC
Docket No. 14024.
33 Hearings on Antitrust Consent Decrees and the Television Broadcasting Industry




limited to the international carriers. 34 Thereafter, the carriers, under
FCC sponsorship, agreed that communication hardware should be
applied on a competitive bid basis.3 5
Congress and the White House staff rejected both the FCC's and
the Justice Department's approaches. The final legislation provided for
a broad ownership base. Half of the consortium stock was to be owned
by the general public and half by the international carriers. The statute
permitted the nonintegrated equipment suppliers-General Electric,
Lockheed, Hughes, and others-to own up to ten percent of the public
half of the stock.36
Congress insisted, as had the Justice Department, that the satellite
corporation, Comsat, seek its wares on an openly competitive basis;
the statute charges the FCC with the task of enforcing this mandate.3 7
The Commission subsequently ruled that all subcontracting tiers must
engage in competitive biddings. Moreover, the Commission's rules
were held applicable to research and development as well as equip-
ment contracts.
38
D. The General Telephone Suit
In June 1964 the Department of Justice sought to enjoin General
Telephone and Electronics Corporation's proposed acquisition of Cali-
fornia Water and Telephone Company, West Coast Telephone Com-
pany, Southwestern States Telephone Company, and Western Utilities
Corporation 9 The Department alleged that consummation of the
acquisition would violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act40 because:
Competitors of General Telephone and its subsidiaries may be
foreclosed from selling products used in the furnishing of telephone
services; and concentration . . . in the manufacture, distribution,
34 Hearings on Space Satellite Communications Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Monopoly of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1961).
35 Ad Hoc Carrier Comm. Report, FCC Docket No. 14024, at 34:
AT&T has no present plans to furnish or offer to furnish to the joint venture any
equipment, apparatus or supplies either directly or through any of its subsidiaries.
However, Western Electric may offer communications components to the joint
venture on a competitive basis ....
See also Response of American Cable & Radio (ITT) Corp. to para. 10 of the Supple-
mental Notice, FCC Docket No. 14024,. at 32,
36 Communication Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. §. 734(b) (1964).
37 Id. § 721(c)(1).
8 Communications Satellite Procurement Regulations, FCC Docket No. 15123, 29
Fed. Reg. 345, 347 (1964).
39 United States v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civil No. 64-1912 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed June 19, 1964).
40 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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and sale of products used in the furnishing of such services may be
increased to the detriment of actual and potential competition.41
The suit thus attempted to restrain the growth of vertical integration
in the telephone industry and to preserve some degree of competition
in its hardware segment.
GT&E contended that the market foreclosure could not possibly
violate the Clayton Act if the relevant market embraced telecommuni-
cations equipment sold to all telephone operating companies. The
companies to be acquired by GT&E accounted for about 0.8 percent
of all equipment purchases.42 Limiting the relevant market to non-Bell
telephone companies, according to GT&E, ignored the Bell consent
decree of 1956. On November 15, 1966, the Justice Department dis-
missed the GT&E suit with this statement:
In view of the unique conditions of this* industry where similar
vertical integration exists of vastly greater size, the Department [of
Justice] determined it would be inappropriate to prosecute its suit
against a single company at this time.43
E. Conclusions
Clearly, the AT&T consent decree typifies a public policy sanction-
ing the common ownership of private manufacturing activities. Bell's
plea that its ownership of Western Electric yielded lower-cost telephone
equipment was held a valid justification for insulating Western Elec-
tric's market from competitive access. In this sense the Justice.Depart-
ment embraced, implicitly or otherwise, the economies-of-integration
postulate. Of course, by requiring Bell to make available its patent
portfolio, the decree did make a gesture towards broadening the availa-
41 Complaint at 8, United States v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civil No. 64-1912
(S.D.N.Y., filed June 19, 1964).
42 See Answer at 4, id.
43 Wall Street Journal, Nov. 15, 1966, at 32. After dismissal by the Justice Department,
GT&E merged with Hawaiian Telephone Company and Northern Ohio Telephone Com-
pany. Thereupon ITT brought suit. Complaint at 9-10, International Tel. & Tel. Coip. v.
General Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civil No. 2754 (D. Hawaii, filed Oct. 18, 1967):
Plaintiff [ITT] has been and now is foreclosed from selling telephone equip-
ment to the operating companies of the Bell System, the General System, and
the UUI System except to the' limited ektent that partiehlar prdducts are not
manufactured by the affiliated system companies.' The ,forelosure of the market
available to plaintiff [ITT] has been severe and now threatens to become so
substantial that plaintiff may be forced to withdraw from the business of manu-
facturing and selling telephone equipment in the United States. General Tele-
phone operating companies, including Hawaiian,- represent a substantial portion
of plaintiff's actual and potential sales of telephone equipment which will be fore-
closed by General Telephone unless appropriate injunctive -relief is granted by
this Court.
See also 34 TEzCOaMMUNIcATION REP., Dec. 26, 1967, at 32.
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bility of technical information and thereby towards fostering market
entry.44 But to the independent equipment supplier Western Electric's
market remains generally impervious to entry.45 Rather than promoting
rivalry, the consent decree tended to induce the opposite result: the
parallel integration of other telephone systems.46
The Communication Satellite Act of 196247 typifies a public policy
favoring the second market alternative: engrafting competitive bidding
to the utility-supplier configuration. Under the Act the FCC is empow-
ered to permit the terminal stations to be owned by Comsat alone,
the international carriers alone, or a combination of each.48 In Decem-
ber 1967 the Commission ruled that satellite earth stations would be
subject to joint ownership between Comsat and the overseas carriers.49
Fifty percent of the ground station ownership is assigned to Comsat;
the remaining fifty percent is spread among the international carriers
on the basis of use. Finally, Comsat acts as the manager for satellite
terminals.
Whether competitive bidding is workable under these circum-
stances remains to be tested. Nonintegrated suppliers have voiced ap-
prehension about their ability to gain market entry notwithstanding
the competition bid rule.50 In any event, as satellites come into domes-
44 REPORT OF THE ANTITRUST SuBcoMm. OF ThE HOUSE CoMMa. ON THE JUDICIARY PUR-
suANr To H.R. 27, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 107-20 (Comm. Print 1959).
45 Id. at 106:
At the outset, it must be observed that nothing in the decree assures manufac-
turers of any opportunity whatever to supply directly the needs of the Bell oper-
ating companies or require a Bell operating company to buy any equipment
competitively from any source other than Western Electric.
46 See The Impact of Two Historic Antitrust Decrees, BusiNEss WEEK, Feb. 4, 1965, at
27. A GT&E spokesman stated:
Actually, the decision was very consoling to us, and presumably to Bell. It
establishes once and for all, with the Justice Dept.'s blessing, that it's legitimate
to have a manufacturing subsidiary.
47 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-44 (1964).
48 Id. § 721(c)(7).
49 Amendment of Part 25 of the Rules and Regulations with Respect to Ownership
and Operation of Initial Earth Stations, FCC Docket No. 15755, Second Report and Order,
Dec. 8, 1966.
50 Reply Comments of Philco Corp. on Proposed Rule-Making or Formulation of
General Policy, at 3, In re Ownership and Operation of Initial Earth Stations, 38 F.C.C.
1104 (1965):
Selection of Comsat would strengthen competition in the provision of communi-
cations services to the public since Comsat's sole objective is to the establishment
of a satellite system on the most competitive basis. With no conflicting ownership
interests in suppliers of equipment or in existing communications facilities,
Comsat's self-interest lies in determined efforts to make satellite communications




tic use, a policy disparity between the domestic and the overseas equip-
ment may become singularly embarrassing.5' With respect to the
domestic communication apparatus, the FCC may not intervene be-
tween the utility and its affiliated manufacturer in terms of compelling
competitive bidding; but with respect to the international equipment,
it must by law intervene.
The remaining policy decisions-the 1949 Bell antitrust complaint,
the 1960 private microwave decision, and the 1964 General Telephone
antitrust complaint-premise the presentation and enhancement of
competition in the equipment market. The result is that the FCC, the
Justice Department, and Congress have pursued all three policy alter-
natives for the equipment industry simultaneously. Clearly, at least
two of these courses of action, competition and vertical integration,
are mutually exclusive. And the second policy option, the amalgam of
integration and competition, appears unworkable.
If public policy in the equipment market is to assume some man-
ner of consistency, it must choose between vertical integration and
competition. The hardware market must be either opened or dosed.
It cannot long remain both, despite perennial attempts at redefining
the relevant market in order to effect a facade of policy continuity. 2
The evidence is persuasive that open market rivalry is a viable, realistic,
and optimal aim for public policy. Vertical integration in the telephone
industry persists as a major impediment to that goal.
V
IMPLEMENTING A POLICY FAVORING COMPETITION
Competition in the communication equipment market can be re-
stored by implementing both a short-term and a long-term program.
The short-term program would permit the retention of utility-owned
A carrier authorized to construct, own and operate an earth station would be
responsible for the planning, 'development and design of the earth station and
would also be responsible for preparation and evaluation of specifications for
apparatus and equipment to be incorporated into the station. Such a carrier
would be in a position to influence and control the procurement of such appa-
ratus and equipment. Unless that carrier and its manufacturing subsidiaries are
barred from furnishing that apparatus and equipment, it may be tempted to
perform its planning, development, and design functions in such a way as to
insure' that its manufacturing subsidiary will be the supplier. Moreover, even
if the planning, development and design functions are performed with complete
objectivity, the carrier may be in a position to 'obtain an unfair competitive
advantage on procurements of equipment for other earth stations. Either of these
situations would prevent effective. competition in the procurement of apparatus,
equipment and services required for establishment and operation of earth stations.
51 Answer of Comsat to ABC petition for Domestic Satellite, id.
52 See Answer at 12-15, United States' v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., Civil No.
64-1912 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 19, 1964). See pp. 460-61 supra.
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manufacturing affiliates but require that some equipment be contracted
out to nonintegrated suppliers. This contracting out, increased over
time, would enable other firms to acquire expertise in the manufactur-
ing of related communication apparatus. Of course, this recommenda-
tion would require that the common carriers make public their
specifications so as to facilitate equipment compatibility.
The long-term program would seek the complete separation of
utility and manufacturing interests. The burden of effecting the pro-
gram would rest with the FCC acting through its powers under the
antitrust laws. Specifically, Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides:
[N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share cap-
ital ... of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly. 3
This provision has been applied to vertical mergers.54 Section 11 of the
Act55 expressly empowers the FCC to enforce compliance with sections
2, 3, 7, and 8, with respect to the carriers under its jurisdiction. Section
11 also expressly provides that the FCC may enforce its antitrust pow-
ers by ordering divestiture.
Since the Commission has never attempted to exercise its antitrust
enforcement power, the scope of its authority has not yet been deter-
mined.56 Consideration of the scope of the Commission's power in the
5 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125-26 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
54 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
55 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964). Section 11 provides, in part:
That authority to enforce compliance with sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of this Act
by the persons respectively subject thereto is hereby vested . . . in the Federal
Communications Commission where applicable to common carriers engaged in
wire or radio communication or radio transmission of energy; . . . and in the
Federal Trade Commission where. applicable to all other character of commerce
to be exercised as follows:
.... If upon such hearing the Commission or Board, as the case may be,
shall be of the opinion that any of the provisions of said sections have been or
are being violated, it shall make a report in writing, in which it shall state its
findings as to the facts, and shall issue and cause to be served on such person
an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such violations, and
divest itself of the stock, or other share capital, or assets, held . . . contrary to
the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of this Act.
64 Stat. 1126-27 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 21,(1964).
5 In In re Connecticut Water Co., 25 F.C.C. 1367 (1958), the Commission did list
as one of the possible dispositive issues whether § 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14
(1964), would be violated if the Commission granted a certain license. The case was




context of the Western Electric situation raises several questions. First,
there are problems concerning the retroactive application of the Clay-
ton Act, since the acquisition occurred in 1881, thirty-three years prior
to the enactment of the Clayton Act in 1914. Second, since the 1956
consent decree left the integration of the Bell System intact, the vertical
relationship has been approved. Finally, the critical question remains
whether the Commission's authority extends to vertical mergers and
therefore includes the power to divest AT&T of Western Electric.
A. Retroactivity and the 1956 Consent Decree
The problem of retroactivity involved in any attempt to divest
AT&T of Western Electric is not as imposing as it may at first appear.
In United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 57 the Supreme Court
held that "the Government may proceed at any time that an acqui-
sition may be said with reasonable probability to contain a threat that
it may lead to a restraint of commerce or tend to create a monopoly
of a line of commerce."58 Between 1917 and 1919 DuPont acquired a
twenty-three percent stock interest in General Motors. Not until 1949
did the Department of Justice challenge the combination under Section
7 of the Clayton Act. The defendants argued that only the acquisition
could be attacked, and that therefore the subsequent use of the stock
was beyond the reach of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court rejected
this contention, stating that the primary purpose of the Clayton Act
is "to arrest apprehended consequences of intercorporate relationships
before those relationships could work their evil, which may be at or
any time after the acquisition, depending upon the circumstances of
the particular case."59 Any other interpretation would severely limit
application of the Clayton Act. One corporation could acquire another
and not immediately use its ownership of the acquired firm in an anti-
competitive manner. Then, after the running of the statute of limita-
tions, it could assert its power over the acquired firm to substantially
lessen competition without fear of government intervention.0
Although AT&T acquired Western Electric prior to the enactment
of the Clayton Act, the DuPont case itself demonstrates that this dis-
tinction is irrelevant. The Supreme Court emphasized that the date
of the occurrence of the anticompetitive effect is the crucial time.61
57 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
58 Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
59 Id. (emphasis added).
60 But see Neal, The Clayton Act and the Transamerica Case, 5 STAN. L. Raw. 179
(1953).
61 The same result follows under the Sherman Act. See Pan Am. World Airways v.
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The consent decree of 1956, which concluded the antitrust suit
brought by the United States in 1949 against the Bell System, likewise
does not impede exercise of the FCC's power to divest AT&T of
Western Electric. The consent decree terminated a Sherman Act suit;
the Commission, when divesting Western Electric from Bell, neces-
sarily enforces the Clayton Act.62 The umbrella thrown over the vertical
integration of the Bell System by the consent decree means only that
the common ownership is not a violation of the Sherman Act. It is
fundamental to the interrelationship of the two antitrust statutes that
the Clayton Act was designed to reach situations that had not ripened
into Sherman Act violations.63 Although the vertical structure of the
Bell System has not been found to be a violation of the Sherman Act,
64
it has never been put to the lesser test of the Clayton Act.65
Applying the Clayton Act to the vertical structure of the Bell
System, then, would not constitute a retroactive application of legal
proscriptions. Nor would it be incompatible with the terms of the 1956
consent decree.
B. FCC Power To Order Divestiture of Vertically Integrated Suppliers
Applying antitrust laws to regulated industries raises a complex
problem. The FCC at best only indirectly regulates Western Electric.66
Applying antitrust standards to a corporate entity that is regulated in
part and unregulated in part only compounds complexity. The Com-
mission's authority to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act can be
interpreted in three ways. First, the scope of its power may be as broad
as that of the Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission
and extend to all forms of acquisitions, both horizontal and vertical. 67
Second, the power may extend only to horizontal mergers. Third, it
may reach only vertical mergers.
United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Assoc., 166 U.S.
290, 342 (1897).
62 The authority to enforce compliance with the substantive provisions of the Clayton
Act is the only antitrust enforcement power available to the FCC. It has no power to
enforce the Sherman Act as such.
63 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 (1962).
64 Consent Decree, United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil No. 17-49 (D.N.J., filed
Jan. 24, 1956).
65 The recent suit against the vertical integration of GT&E was based upon the
Clayton Act, and in this respect is distinguishable from the situation in the Western
Electric case.
66 The absence of any pervasive regulatory scheme indicates that antitrust, rather
than traditional regulation, may be the guiding principle in such a situation. See Pan
Am. World Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963).




Section 221 of the Communications Act 8 states that two telephone
companies wishing to consolidate may seek approval from the Commis-
sion. In reaching its decision, the Commission is to consider the public
interest and the effect on telephone service. Commission approval of
the transaction exempts the merger from all antitrust laws. The exemp-
tion brings the situation within the rationale of McLean Trucking Co.
v. United States,609 namely, that without Commission approval hori-
zontal mergers would be subject to the antitrust laws. The McLean
case held that the Interstate Commerce Commission was not compelled
to disapprove a merger of trucking firms that violated the antitrust
laws. Limiting ICC approval to those situations that do not violate the
antitrust laws would render meaningless the exemption from antitrust
application that flows from such -approval. The Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed this doctrine in Seaboard Air Line Railroad v. United
States.70 It must be remembered, however, that section 221 is not man-
datory; the parties need not ask for approval. 1
Section 222 of the Domestic Merger Act of 194372 makes lawful
the merger of domestic telegraph carriers upon Commission approval.
The standard for approval is the public interest, and again Commis-
sion approval carries with it an exemption from the antitrust laws.
Section 222 differs from section 221 in that telegraph carriers must fol-
low its provisions. One of the primary objectives of the Domestic
Merger Act was to allow Western Union and Postal Telegraph to
merge; it was thought that otherwise the antitrust laws would prohibit
the consolidation. 73 This Act deliberately repudiated the antitrust laws
68 47 U.S.C. § 221 (1964).
69 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
70 582 U.S. 154 (1965).
71 Apparently the Commission views its jurisdiction as limited to actual telephone
operating companies. GT&E, which is merely a holding company, has never sought Com-
mission common-carrier-type approval for acquisitions of telephone companies, and ap-
parently none has ever been demanded by the Commission. The acquisition of operating
companies by GT&E recently challenged by the Justice Department was not submitted to
the FCC. Apparently GT&E has the best of two worlds with regard to horizontal mergers.
If it is apprehensive of FCC reaction, the parent holding company will acquire the oper-
ating company, and only the antitrust enforcement by the Justice Department will remain
an obstacle. If antitrust is the primary concern, then one of the subsidiary interstate
operating companies will acquire the new firm, and the Commission could insulate the
merger from antitrust possibilities under § 221.
72 47 U.S.C. § 222 (1964).
73 It is quite possible that the antitrust laws would not have prohibited the telegraph
merger. Postal Telegraph was in dire fnancial straits. In International Shoe Co. v. FTC,
280 U.S. 291 (1930), the Supreme Court held that no violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act
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as the standard for measuring a horizontal merger of two domestic
telegraph carriers. Another purpose of the Act was to promote com-
petition,7 4 which, when coupled with the express repudiation of the
antitrust laws, provides an interesting commentary on the latter's effec-
tiveness in seeking their primary purpose of promoting competition.
Section 314 of the Communications Act in effect prohibits the
merger or common ownership of an international radio carrier and
an international cable or wire carrier, if the purpose or effect of such
single ownership is to lessen competition substantially or to restrain
commerce between any place within the United States and any place
in a foreign country or to create a monopoly in any line of commerce.75
The language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act is similar to that of Sec-
tion 314 of the Communications Act.76 In the so-called "Three Circuits"
case,77 however, the Supreme Court held:
What may substantially lessen competition in those areas where
competition is the main reliance for regulation of the market can-
not be automatically transplanted to areas in which active regula-
tion is entrusted to an administrative agency; ... what competition
is and should be in such areas must be read in the light of the
special considerations that have influenced Congress to make spe-
cific provision for the particular industry.78
Thus, the standards of the antitrust laws do not themselves apply to
the regulated international telecommunications industry, although the
wording of the relevant standard is almost identical to the Clayton Act.
Under the Clayton Act a violation occurs if competition may be
lessened in one line of commerce; the merger may fall even if compe-
tition as a whole has been improved.79 In administering the Communi-
cations Act the "Three Circuits" case held that the Commission is to
had occurred where the acquired firm faced business failure. There is little doubt that
Postal Telegraph was a "failing company" within the meaning of International Shoe. It
was, in fact, on the verge of bankruptcy. H.R. REP. No. 2664, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4
(1942).
74 H.R. REP. No. 2664, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
75 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1964).
76 Section 7 of the Clayton Act uses the phrase "where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen
competition, or tend to create a monopoly." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1126
(1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). Section 314 of the Communications Act applies when the
"effect thereof may be to substantially lessen competition or to restrain commerce between
any place in any State, Territory, or possession of the United States, . . . and any place
in any foreign country, or unlawfully to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
48 Stat. 1088 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 314 (1964).
77 FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
78 Id. at 98.
79 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
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consider the broad spectrum of international communications. If a
merger will further competition in that perspective, then no violation
occurs, even if competition is stifled between the particular routes in
question.
Section 214 is the remaining provision of the Communications
Act pertaining to horizontal mergers. Although the section does not
primarily govern mergers, it does require Commission approval for the
acquisition of a "line" by a carrier.80 Furthermore, the section is ex-
pressly inapplicable if the transaction has been approved under sections
221 or 222, the sections primarily designed to govern mergers. But by
the general terms of its language, it applies residually to all mergers
not governed by the three specific provisions previously discussed: "No
carrier... shall acquire.., any line.., unless and until there shall
first have been obtained from the Commission a certificate [of] public
convenience and necessity ... ,"81 It may also apply to a merger within
the scope of section 221, for, as we have seen, that section is not man-
datory and is invoked purely at the discretion of the interested carriers.
The distinguishing feature of section 214 is that no exemption
from the antitrust laws flows from Commission approval; the impli-
cation is that the antitrust laws, including Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
apply to such mergers. The language of the Supreme Court in the
"Three Circuits" case, however, indicates that an accommodation must
be made between regulatory statutes and the antitrust laws. Indeed,
one leading commentator builds the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
in the antitrust field on the "Three Circuits" case.8 2 While this may be
the correct view with regard to international communications-after
all, section 214 applies specifically to the same policies as do the anti-
trust laws-one should be wary of applying the principle to other ele-
ments of the communications industry. No matter how the word "accom-
modation" is defined, in this context it means at least that the antitrust
laws do not apply per se. But if the antitrust laws do not apply at all
to mergers in the communication industry, it is difficult to understand
the necessity for the express exemption from antitrust violations found
in sections 221 and 222. Indeed, since section 221 is not mandatory and
80 A "line" is defined in § 214 as "any channel of communication established by the
use of appropriate equipment, other than a channel of communication established by the
interconnection of two or more existing channels." 57 Stat. 11 (1943), 47 U.S.C. § 214(a)
(1964).
8157 Stat. 11 (1943), 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (1964).
82 3 IL DAvis, ADMiNimTLVI LAW § 19.05 (1958). Another authority has stated that
no cases applying primary jurisdiction to the communications industry exist. STzF Op
SUBCoMm. No. 5 oF THE HousE COMm. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., 2D Sass., JUDICIAL
DocTRiNE oF PImARY JuRiSDmCnoN As APPLI IN ANTRusr Surms (1956).
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section 214 applies if section 221 is not invoked, the accommodation
theory renders the exemption in section 221 particularly superfluous.
And yet, the only significant distinction between the two provisions
with respect to merger policy is the exemption in section 221.
That the antitrust laws may apply to a horizontal merger also
governed by section 214 does not necessarily mean the FCC has the
duty to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act. If the FCC does not en-
force section 7, the Department of Justice still has that obligation.
Furthermore, since no exemption flows from Commission approval
under this provision, the Department of Justice would not be precluded
from attacking an FCC-approved merger.
Finally, the FCC has no obligation to measure section 214 mergers
by antitrust standards, because the section contains its own standard,
i.e., public convenience and necessity. While competitive effects may
well be relevant to a determination of public convenience and neces-
sity,83 other factors must also be considered. In the so-called "Mt.
Gilead" case,84 the Commission granted a section 214 authorization to
Western Union to discontinue its operation of six telegraph offices in
Ohio and to substitute agency offices to be operated by the local tele-
phone companies operating in each community. The labor organization
representing Western Union employees challenged the Commission's
action. The district court stated that the central question was "whether
the Commission has power to approve an agreement between a tele-
graph company and a telephone company, if the effect of the agreement
is to lessen competition between the companies in a given locality."8 5
The Commission stoutly maintained it did. The district court skirted
the question by holding that the agreement was not invalid under the
antitrust law as then interpreted.8 6 The fact remains, however, that the
FCC contended that it could issue a section 214 authorization despite
a violation of the antitrust laws. The Commission, too, must believe
it enforces section 214 by applying its express standards, and not by
enforcing the antitrust laws.
When deciding the fate of all horizontal mergers, the FCC applies
the tests contained in the Communications Act, not the test of the
Clayton Act. For the most part, these standards are stated in terms of
public interest, which may include competitive effects but which em-
83 Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 186 (1959).
84 Western Union Division, Commercial Telegraphers' Union v. United States, 87
F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam, 338 U.& 864 (1949).




brace other factors as well. Indeed, in sections 221 and 222, FCC ap-
proval suspends the antitrust laws. The one merger-governing provision
that specifically demands competitive effects as the relevant standard,
section 314, has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to be broader
than the Clayton Act. 7 Thus, the FCC does not merely enforce the
Clayton Act when considering horizontal mergers under its special
merger powers.
2. Vertical Mergers
Since the FCC already has special powers, often broader than the
Clayton Act, to regulate horizontal mergers, the express provision by
which it can enforce the Clayton Act itself implies that the FCC has
power to regulate vertical arrangements. Otherwise the express grant
of Clayton Act powers would be relatively meaningless. Further, the
Clayton Act entrusts to the FCC enforcement of all its operative sec-
tions, i.e., sections 2 and 3, as well as 7. Section 2, the Robinson-Patman
Act,88 prohibits discriminatory pricing practices and controls customer-
supplier relationships. Although much of the pricing policies of carriers
is subject to traditional concepts of regulation, some areas of carrier
pricing remain beyond the scope of the Commission's non-antitrust
authority.89 Section 3,90 dealing with tying agreements and exclusive
dealing arrangements, likewise concerns vertical relationships. 91 Since
the Commission's authority extends to the full reach of sections 2 and
3, there seems to be no reason the power should not extend to the full
reach of section 7, including vertical relationships.
This interpretation is not novel. As long ago as 1921, just seven
years after the enactment of the Clayton Act, a court of appeals reached
the same conclusion. The Interstate Commerce Commission has the
same authority as the FCC to enforce the Clayton Act provisions against
the common carriers under its jurisdiction.9 2 A railroad car company,
a noncarrier, had included in its contract to supply cars to a railroad
carrier a provision prohibiting the carrier from using cars supplied by
other companies. The Federal Trade Commission entered a cease and
87 FCC v. RCA Communications, 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
88 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
89 For example, the Commission considers itself without authority to regulate the
charges imposed by one carrier upon other carriers for leased facilities. Hearings on HR.
10270 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
24 (1964).
90 15 US.C. § 14 (1964).
91 The Commission has indicated in testimony before Congress that it has § 3 power.
Hearings on H.R. 10270, supra note 89, at 25. See also note 56 supra.
92 Clayton Act § 11, 15 US.C. § 21(a) (1964).
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desist order against this practice, viewing the contract provision as a
violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. The court of appeals, in
Fruit Growers' Express, Inc. v. FTC, 93 held that the FTC has no power
to enter such an order, because authority over this transaction rests
with the Interstate Commerce Commission. The court said:
The words "where applicable to common carriers," in section
11 of the Clayton Act, must mean that where the facts involve
common carriers, or the business of common carriers, then the
jurisdiction is solely in the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
action complained of involved common carriers and tended to very
greatly affect their business.94
The FCC could be substituted for the ICC in that case without a
change in the decision. Furthermore, if section 7 had been involved,
instead of section 3, the result would have been unchanged. But the
necessary implication is that the FCC enjoys the full reach of the Clay-
ton Act in proscribing discriminatory pricing, tying agreements, exclu-
sive dealing arrangements, and, most significant, anticompetitive
vertical mergers.
CONCLUSION
Among the three policy alternatives for structuring the communi-
cation equipment market-competition, vertical integration, and a
mixture of the two-competition best serves the public interest. It not
only meets the test of economic efficiency, but also marks a return to
a unified, consistent policy. Divestiture, then, is but a step to reaching
these goals. Clearly, Bell's divestiture of Western Electric would not
resolve General Telephone's vertical relationship, nor would it settle
the ambivalence of policy in the satellite equipment market.95 It is,
however, a necessary ingredient to a broader policy endeavor.
93 274 F. 205 (7th Cir. 1921), appeal dismissed, 261 US. 629 (1923).
94 Id. at 207.
95 See 32 TELECOMMUNICATIONs REP., March 28, 1966, at 1.
